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Barlow: Confrontation Clause Concerns

CONFLICTING CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONCERNS: THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF HOSPITAL RECORDS VERSUS A
DEFENDANT’S RIGHT TO CONFRONTATION
SUPREME COURT OF NEW YORK
BRONX COUNTY
People v. Diaz1
(decided May 9, 2012)
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1977, a New York Supreme Court jury returned a guilty
verdict against Enrique Diaz, finding him guilty of rape, kidnapping,
and coercion in the first degree.2 Then, in 2011, Diaz brought a motion pursuant to New York Criminal Procedure Law section 440
seeking to vacate the conviction.3 Diaz’s appeal asserted that he was
deprived of his Sixth Amendment confrontation rights when the trial
court allowed the state to introduce notations made by a hospital resident who did not testify.4 The defendant alleged that the hospital
records, which included the notations, were testimonial in nature
analogous to the forensic reports in the influential United States Supreme Court case, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.5 Diaz also contended that the hospital report was prepared with the primary purpose
of proving facts related to the prosecution of his alleged crime.6
“On April 28, 1978, the Appellate Division, First Department,
1

People v. Diaz, No. 02843-1975, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012).
Id. at *2.
3
Id. at *3; N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 440.10 (allowing a defendant to file a motion seeking
to vacate their judgment based on “[m]aterial evidence adduced by the people at a trial resulting in the judgment was procured in violation of the defendant’s rights under the constitution of this state or of the United States”).
4
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *1.
5
Id. at *5. See Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305, 311 (2009) (holding certificates prepared by non-testifying laboratory analysts were testimonial statements, and the
“analysts were ‘witnesses’ for the purposes of the Sixth Amendment”).
6
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5.
2

1399

Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2013

1

Touro Law Review, Vol. 29, No. 4 [2013], Art. 21

1400

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29

. . . affirmed [Diaz’s] conviction without opinion.7 A year later, Diaz
filed a habeas corpus petition in which the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed.8 In response,
Diaz filed a 440 motion on Sixth Amendment grounds, which was also subsequently denied.9 The court held that the hospital reports
were non-testimonial and properly admitted under the state’s business
records exception to hearsay.10
New York precedent supports the notion that statements made
by a patient to a physician are not testimonial as long as they are in
response to a physician’s inquiry that has the primary objective of determining the mechanism of injury, rendering a diagnosis, and administering medical treatment.11 Although the Supreme Court has yet to
decide whether hospital records constitute testimonial evidence within the scope of the Confrontation Clause, the Court has addressed
both the testimonial nature of forensic laboratory reports as well as
the relevance of statements made by an individual during the existence of an ongoing emergency.12 This note will discuss whether the
Diaz opinion is consistent with New York’s approach in determining
admissibility of hospital records based on their testimonial nature and
the business records exception. It will also examine the extent to
which New York has adopted or departed from federal precedent.
Lastly, this analysis will include a prediction of how the Supreme
Court will decide on this issue.

7
8
9

Id. at *3.
Id.
Id. at *1.

10

Contrary to the Defendant’s contention, the hospital record in this case is
not like the forensic report deemed testimonial by the Supreme Court in
Melendez-Diaz, but rather, the record reflected occurrences and events
that related to the diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of the complainant
and was therefore properly admitted into evidence under the state’s business records exception to the hearsay rule.
Id. at *5 (citing People v. Ortega, 942 N.E.2d 210, 214 (2010)).
11
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *4 (citing People v. Duhs, 947 N.E.2d 617, 409 (N.Y.
2011) (holding “where the primary purpose of a physician’s inquiry to a patient is to determine the mechanism in order to render a diagnosis and administer medical treatment, statements made by the patient to the physician are not testimonial in nature”).
12
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311; Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 828 (2006).
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THE FACTS OF PEOPLE V. DIAZ

Diaz was charged and convicted of kidnapping and raping a
young female.13 At issue in the case was the testimony of Dr. Paul
Fuchs.14 Dr. Fuchs was the complainant’s physician and a witness
for the prosecution.15 At trial, Dr. Fuchs testified that the complainant first sought his medical assistance at his office and that he continued to treat her after admitting her to the hospital.16 He attested to the
hospital’s record of the complainant’s stay as well as his personal examinations.17 The hospital records included the notes and observations of the admitting physician at the hospital.18 According to Dr.
Fuchs, he was required to read the notations of the admitting physician and if he believed them to be accurate, he was to sign the record.19 Dr. Fuchs testified that he signed the record because he agreed
with the report.20 In addition, Dr. Fuchs attested to the fact that the
“hospital record was kept in the regular course of business.”21
Counsel for the defense objected to Dr. Fuchs’s testimony
based on two separate grounds. First, the defense objected to Dr.
Fuchs’s statement that the complainant “was suffering from ‘reactive
anxiety depression and weight loss’ ” stemming from the assault
committed by Diaz.22 The defense argued that his observations were
unrelated and were assuming the jury’s role of assessing the credibility of the complaining witness.23 Second, Diaz’s counsel objected to
the trial court’s admission of the hospital record and argued that parts
of the record included injuries inflicted upon the complainant that
were committed by a co-conspirator.24 The trial judge overruled both
objections and allowed the hospital record to be admitted into evi-

13

Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *1.
Id. at *2-3.
15
Id. at *2.
16
Id. at *5.
17
Id. at *2 (referring to the testimony introduced by in which he “reviewed the record at
trial to refresh his recollection of his own observations of the complainant”).
18
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id. at *5.
22
Id. at *2.
23
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2.
24
Id.
14
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dence.25
In 1977, Diaz appealed his conviction claiming ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the admittance of the hospital records at trial.26 The Appellate Division, First department affirmed Diaz’s conviction on April 28, 1978.27 A year later, Diaz
unsuccessfully sought habeas relief when the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York dismissed his petition.28
Then in August of 2011, Diaz filed a CPL 440 motion to vacate his
conviction, asserting that the admission of the complainant’s hospital
record violated his Sixth Amendment constitutional right to confrontation.29 The Supreme Court of Bronx County denied Diaz’s motion
holding that the defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause
were not violated because the hospital record was not testimonial in
nature.30 Furthermore, the court ruled the hospital record was admissible under New York’s business records exception to the hearsay
rule.31
III.

THE COURT’S REASONING
A.

Confrontation Clause

The court’s denial of Diaz’s appeal began with a discussion of
the federal approach towards confrontation issues in its analysis of
Crawford v. Washington32 and its progeny. The Sixth Amendment
bestows upon the accused “the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.”33 In Crawford, the Supreme Court held that
the Confrontation Clause prohibits the admission of out-of-court
statements that are testimonial in nature unless the declarant is una25
Id. at *2-3 (“Justice Rosenberg overruled the objections of the Defendant’s trial counsel, with an instruction to the jury that they were not required to decide whether the complainant had a condition or not; the doctor’s testimony related to the issue of the complainant’s credibility.”).
26
Id. at *3.
27
Id.
28
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *3.
29
Id. at *1, *3.
30
Id. at *5.
31
Id.
32
541 U.S. 36 (2004).
33
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2713 (2011); U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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vailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the declarant regarding the statements at issue.34 Crawford failed to
provide a comprehensive definition of “testimonial,” but two years
later in Davis v. Washington35 the Court established the “primary
purpose” test as a means of determining whether statements are testimonial or not.36 Under the “primary purpose” test, statements made
with the primary purpose of proving facts or events in anticipation of
a criminal trial are deemed testimonial in nature.37
The court in Diaz applied the “primary purpose” test introduced by Davis and held that the complainant’s hospital record was
not testimonial because it was not prepared with the primary purpose
of proving facts relevant to the prosecution of a crime.38 The court
reasoned that the circumstances surrounding the time in which the
complainant’s statements were made to the doctor did not suggest
that the record was prepared in anticipation of proving facts relevant
to the prosecution of Diaz.39
B.

Business Record Exception

The court deemed the hospital record non-testimonial because
it reflected “occurrences and events related to the diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of the complainant.”40 As such, the records were
admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule.41
Since business records are generally admissible when they are not
deemed testimonial, Diaz’s Sixth Amendment rights were not violat34

Crawford, 541 U.S. at 59 (recognizing “[t]estimonial statements of witnesses absent
from trial have been admitted only where the declarant is unavailable, and only where the
defendant has had a prior opportunity to cross-examine”).
35
547 U.S. 813 (2006).
36
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (“We leave for another day any effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of “testimonial”); Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (holding “[statements] are testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution”).
37
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
38
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5 (“In this case, the hospital record was not prepared with
the primary purpose of proving facts relevant to the prosecution of a crime.”).
39
Id. (“At trial, Dr. Fuchs testified that he was treating the complainant as a patient, that
she first came to him at his private practice, and that thereafter he admitted her to the hospital.”).
40
Id.
41
Id.
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ed.42
The Diaz court also relied on several notable New York Court
of Appeals cases in coming to the business record exception determination. For example, the court found the statements made by the
complainant to Dr. Fuchs were comparable to the statement admitted
in People v. Ortega.43 In Ortega, the court held medical records to be
admissible under the business records exception because of the record’s reference to a safety plan and incidents of domestic violence,
which were relevant to the victim’s treatment.44 Evidently the court
in Diaz found that the complainant had suffered similar psychological
and traumatic issues as the complainant in Ortega.45 Having been
victims of domestic violence and rape, it is likely that they both endured more than just physical wounds.46 The statements elicited from
the complainant in Diaz, just like those from Ortega, were necessary
in order to properly diagnose and treat her. 47
In addition to Ortega, the court in Diaz referenced three other
relevant New York decisions that admitted reports under the business
records exception, despite the fact that the reports contained state-

42

Id.
942 N.E.2d 210 (N.Y. 2010).
44
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5 (citing Ortega, 942 N.E. 2d at 215 (holding “references
to ‘domestic violence’ and to the existence of a safety plan were admissible under the business records exception”)).
Not only were these statements relevant to complainant’s diagnosis and
treatment, domestic violence was part of the attending physician’s diagnosis in this case. With all that has been learned about the scourge of
domestic violence in recent decades, we now recognize that it differs
materially, both as an offense and a diagnosis, from other types of assault in its effect on the victim and in the resulting treatment. In this
context, a doctor faced with a victim who has been assaulted by an intimate partner is not only concerned with bandaging wounds. In addition
to physical injuries, a victim of domestic violence may have a whole
host of other issues to confront, including psychological and trauma issues that are appropriately part of medical treatment. Developing a safety plan, including referral to a shelter where appropriate, and dispensing
information about domestic violence and necessary social services can
be an important part of the patient’s treatment. Therefore, it was not error to admit references to domestic violence and a safety plan in complainant's medical records.
Id.
45
Id. at *5.
46
Ortega, 942 N.E. 2d at 212; Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *1.
47
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5.
43
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ments of non-testifying witnesses.48 First, in People v. Freycinet,49
the Court of Appeals deemed the factual portions of an autopsy report
to be non-testimonial and was properly introduced at trial under the
business records exception, even though the doctor who prepared the
report did not testify.50 Second, the Diaz opinion relied on People v.
Hall51 where the First Department admitted an autopsy report under
the business records exception without requiring the medical examiner who created the report to testify.52 Last, the court in Diaz rendered
the holding in People v. Brown53 to be applicable in its analysis. In
Brown, a DNA report consisting of raw data produced by a machine
was admissible under the business record exception, despite the fact
that the analyst who compiled the report did not testify.54 Although
the Diaz opinion does not explicitly mention the statements made by
the complainant to Dr. Fuchs, the court found reason to believe that
the record reflected information that was germane to administering
the appropriate medical treatment and provided sufficient New York
precedent to support its findings.55
IV.

THE FEDERAL APPROACH

To fully understand the issue that was before the court in Diaz, it is pertinent to discuss the impact of several notable Supreme
Court cases that have shaped the Confrontation Clause analysis. Despite having been abrogated by Crawford, a brief synopsis of the
1980 Supreme Court decision Ohio v. Roberts56 is an appropriate
starting point.
In Roberts, the defendant was charged and convicted of for48

Id.
892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y. 2008).
50
Id. at 846 (holding that an autopsy report was non-testimonial and thus admissible under the business records exception to the hearsay rule).
51
923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (App Div. 1st Dep’t 2011).
52
See Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d at 429 (holding that an autopsy report was non-testimonial and
its admission into evidence did not violate defendant‘s rights under the Confrontation
Clause).
53
918 N.E.2d 927 (N.Y. 2009).
54
See Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932 (holding that the court’s admission of a DNA report despite not producing the technician who performed the testing did not violate defendant‘s
rights under the confrontation clause).
55
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5.
56
448 U.S. 56 (1980).
49
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gery of a check and possession of stolen credit cards.57 The defendant appealed and the Supreme Court of Ohio found that the use of the
transcript from the preliminary trial, which included testimony from
the defendant’s daughter, violated Roberts’ confrontation rights.58
The court reasoned that the transcript should not have been introduced because the defendant’s daughter had not been cross-examined
at the preliminary hearing and did not appear at trial.59
Roberts made its way up to the United States Supreme Court
where the Court was faced with determining whether it was constitutional to admit testimony from a preliminary hearing despite the witness not being produced at the defendant’s criminal trial.60 The Supreme Court held that the introduction of the daughter’s testimony
from the defendant’s preliminary hearing did not offend the Confrontation Clause because it was “subjected to the equivalent of significant cross-examination” and bore adequate “indicia of reliability.”61
The Court explained that the test for determining sufficient “indicia
of reliability” is one that either falls “within a firmly rooted hearsay
exception” or bears “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”62
In Crawford, the Supreme Court overturned the “indicia of reliability” framework established by Roberts,63 instituting a test based
on a statement’s “testimoniality” instead. In Crawford, the defendant
was charged with assault and attempted murder for stabbing a man
who allegedly tried to rape his wife, Silvia Crawford.64 In an effort to

57
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. During Robert’s preliminary hearing, the defense called Bernard Isaacs’ daughter, Anita Isaacs, as a witness who attested to the fact that she had given
Roberts permission to reside in her apartment for several days while she was away. Id.
Anita denied all allegations made by the defense counsel that she had given Roberts permission to use her father’s checks and credit cards. Id. In addition to the defense counsel’s failure to request Anita be placed on cross-examination, the defense did not declare Anita as a
hostile witness. Id. After the grand jury indicted Roberts on all charges, five subpoenas
were issued to Anita but she failed to appear at the trial return date. Id. at 59.
58
Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59-60, 62.
59
Id. at 61-62.
60
Id. at 58.
61
Id. at 78.
62
Id. at 66.
63
See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68 (overturning the precedent established by Roberts and
properly holding that “the State admitted Sylvia’s testimonial statement against petitioner,
despite the fact that he had no opportunity to cross-examine her, alone is sufficient to make
out a violation of the Sixth Amendment . . . we decline to mine the record in search of indicia of reliability”).
64
Id. at 38.
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prove the defendant was not acting in self-defense, the State played
the police recording of Sylvia’s account of the events in question.65
Crawford was convicted but appealed his case to the Washington
Court of Appeals, which reversed his conviction.66 However, on review the Washington Supreme Court reversed and reinstated Crawford’s conviction.67 The court reasoned that Sylvia Crawford’s
statement satisfied the “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness”
standard set forth in Roberts.68 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and reversed the court’s decision.69
Unlike Roberts, the main focus of the Crawford opinion outlined the historical background of the Confrontation Clause.70 Justice
Scalia addressed the shortcomings of the Roberts opinion by pointing
out that the “indicia of reliability” test was in conflict with two important principles.71 First, the purpose of the Confrontation Clause
was to guard against the “use of ex parte examinations as evidence
against the accused.”72 Scalia elaborated on this by stating that the
aim of the Confrontation Clause is to bar the admission of testimonial
hearsay and contended that the interrogations conducted by the police
fell within that class.73 Second, the Framers were not of the opinion
that the prior opportunity to cross-examine a witness was a dispositive right.74 Rather, historical sources indicate that the “Framers
would not have allowed the admission of testimonial statements of a
witness who did not appear at trial unless he was unavailable to testify and the defendant had had a prior opportunity for cross65
Id. The defendant did not have an opportunity to cross-examine his wife because her
interrogation took place at the police station. Id. at 65. Sylvia Crawford did not testify because of marital privilege. Id. at 40.
66
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 41.
67
Id.
68
Id. (holding “although Sylvia’s statement did not fall under a firmly rooted hearsay exception, it bore guarantees of trustworthiness” because Sylvia’s statements and those made
by the defendant appear to overlap).
69
Id. at 42.
70
Id. at 66 (recognizing how the Framer’s would react: “The Framers would be astounded
to learn that ex parte testimony could be admitted against a criminal defendant because it
was elicited by ‘neutral’ government officers”).
71
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 36.
72
Id. at 36-37 (stating that the “Roberts test departs from historical principals because it
admits statements consisting of ex parte testimony upon a mere reliability finding”).
73
Id. at 36 (observing “[t]he Clause’s primary object is testimonial hearsay, and interrogations by law enforcement officers fall squarely within that class”).
74
Id. at 52.
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examination.”75
Crawford is also distinguishable from Roberts in that it
stressed the importance of differentiating between non-testimonial
and testimonial statements when facing Confrontation Clause issues.76 While Justice Scalia did not provide an exhaustive definition
of “testimonial,” he did give some insight as to the persons and types
of evidence the clause was aimed at.77 Scalia observed that the Confrontation Clause is applicable to those who “bear testimony” against
the accused.78 Furthermore, “[a]n accuser who makes a formal
statement to government officers bears testimony in a sense that a
person who makes a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.”79
Moreover, Scalia provided an informal test for establishing the presence of a testimonial statement when he stated: “[S]tatements that
[are] made under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available for
use at a later trial” are considered testimonial.80 Under this test, examples of testimonial statements would include, but are not limited
to, depositions, confessions, affidavits, custodial examinations and
ex-parte-testimony.81
Under this reasoning, the Supreme Court found the statements
taken by the police officers while conducting their interrogation to be
testimonial in nature82 and that the admission of such evidence violated the defendant’s right to confrontation because he did not have a
prior opportunity to cross-examine his wife and she was unavailable
75

Id. at 36 (“And the ‘right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him,’ is most
naturally read as a reference to the common-law right of confrontation, admitting only those
exceptions established at the time of the founding.”).
76
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69, 71-72.
77
Id. at 68.
78
Id. at 51.
79
Id.
80
Id. at 52.
81

Various formulations of this core class of ‘testimonial’ statements exist:
‘ex parte in-court testimony or its functional equivalent-that is, material
such as affidavits, custodial examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar pretrial statements that
declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially, . . . extrajudicial statements contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony or confessions.’
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52.
82
Id. at 68.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol29/iss4/21

10

Barlow: Confrontation Clause Concerns

2013]

CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONCERNS

1409

to testify at trial.83 Crawford’s significant impact on the way courts
assess issues involving the Confrontation Clause is two-fold: First, it
abrogated the longstanding precedent established in Roberts. Second,
the opinion failed to provide a comprehensive definition of what constitutes a “testimonial” statement, leaving courts treading in unchartered seas. However, in 2006, the Supreme Court provided some
much needed clarity by introducing the “primary purpose” test set
forth in Davis v. Washington as a way to distinguish testimonial and
non-testimonial statements.84
In Davis, the Supreme Court was faced with the issue of
whether statements made during a recording of a 911 call were testimonial, and thus subject to the requirements of the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause.85 The testimony in question, made by
Michelle McCottry to a 911 operator, included statements in which
McCotty identified and described a domestic dispute with her former
boyfriend, Adrian Davis.86 The State introduced the 911 recording
and the defense objected, contending that its admittance violated Davis’s Sixth Amendment right to cross-examine McCottry.87 The trial
court allowed the State to play the recording for the jury and Davis
was eventually convicted.88 Both the Washington Court of Appeals
and the Supreme Court of Washington upheld Davis’s conviction,
finding the 911 conversation identifying Davis as the assailant to be
non-testimonial.89
The Supreme Court affirmed, ruling that McCottry’s statements made to the 911 operator, while the defendant was still within
the vicinity and in violation of a no-contact order, were not testimonial, and therefore not subject to the Confrontation Clause.90 The
Court reasoned, “Statements are nontestimonial [sic] when made in
the course of a police interrogation under circumstances objectively
indicating that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable
police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency.”91 In contrast,
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91

Id. at 68-69.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
Id. at 817.
Id.
Id. at 819.
Id.
Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.
Id. at 829.
Id. at 822.
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statements should be considered testimonial “when the circumstances
objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that
the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”92
In the Davis opinion, the Supreme Court distinguished the testimonial statements made in Crawford from the non-testimonial
statements at issue in Davis.93 For example, in Davis, the statements
in question were made by the victim as the events were happening in
real time,94 whereas the statements made by Crawford’s wife took
place several hours after the stabbing occurred.95 Second, the Davis
statements elicited by the 911 call were “necessary to enable the police to resolve the present emergency, rather than simply learn . . .
what had happened in the past,” which was the case in Crawford.96
Lastly, the Court pointed out the distinct difference in the level of
formality in the way the absentee witnesses answered questions in the
respective cases.97 In Crawford, the defendant’s wife “was responding calmly, at the station house, to a series of questions, with the officer-interrogator taping and making notes of her answers.”98 The
circumstances in Davis were strikingly less formal where the victim
frantically answered questions prompted by a 911 operator while she
remained in an unsafe and hostile environment.99 For these reasons,
the Court in Davis felt McCottry was not acting as a witness for purposes of a criminal investigation.100
Three years after Davis, the Supreme Court provided even
more insight when it decided Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts.
There, the defendant was charged with trafficking and distributing
cocaine.101 The State introduced certificates authored by state labora92

Id.
Id. at 827 (“The difference between the interrogations in Davis and the one in Crawford
is apparent on the face of things.”).
94
Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
95
See id. (comparing statements made by complainant in Davis versus statements in question in Crawford).
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id.
99
Davis, 547 U.S. at 827 (“McCottry’s frantic answers were provided over the phone, in
an environment that was not tranquil, or even . . . safe.”).
100
Id. at 828 (holding “that the circumstances of McCottry’s interrogation objectively indicate its primary purpose was to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emergency”).
101
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 308.
93
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tory analysts indicating the presence of cocaine from seized evidence.102 Despite the analysts not testifying at trial, the trial court allowed the certificates to be admitted and the defendant was convicted.103 On appeal, the defendant argued that the admission of the
certificates violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him.104 Relying on the precedent established by Crawford, the defense asserted that the prosecution’s use of the certificates
was contingent upon the analysts testifying in person at the defendant’s trial.105
The Supreme Court ruled in favor of Melendez-Diaz and
found there to be “no Crawford exception” that would allow the introduction of affidavits comprised of forensic analysis for the purpose
of proving the defendant was in possession of cocaine, where the affiants did not testify at trial.106 The Court relied on the “primary purpose” test in finding that the certificates were testimonial, reasoning
that the affidavits were being used to prove or establish historical
events relevant to a criminal trial expected to take place in the future.107 It is important to note that the majority explicitly rejected the
respondent’s comparison of the affidavits to the business records admissible at common law.108 However, the majority elaborated on the
use of business records and stated that “[d]ocuments kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their
hearsay status,”109 although the Court was quick to add that “th[is] is
not the case if the regularly conducted business activity is the production of evidence for use at a trial.”110
102

Id.
Id. at 309.
104
Id. The Supreme Court was faced with the issue of whether affidavits by analysts at a
state lab, attesting that the substance analyzed was cocaine, were testimonial rendering the
affiants “witnesses” subject to the defendant’s right of confrontation under the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 307.
105
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 309 (“Petitioner objected to the admission of the certificates asserting our Confrontation Clause decision in Crawford v. Washington, required the
analysts to testify in person.”).
106
Id. at 311.
107
Id. (ruling that if an out of court statement is being used to prove an event previously
occurred then it is subject to the Confrontation Clause).
108
Id. at 321.
109
Id.
110
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 321. See Palmer v. Hofmann, 318 U.S. 109, 114 (1943)
(holding that an accident report made by an employee of a railroad company did not qualify
as a business record because, although kept in the regular course of the railroad’s operations,
103
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Another noteworthy Supreme Court case elaborating on the
term “ongoing emergency” with respect to the primary purpose test is
Michigan v. Bryant.111 In Bryant, the Court faced the issue of whether the Confrontation Clause barred the admission of statements made
at a crime-scene by a mortally wounded victim that identified and described the location and identity of his assailant.112 The Court held
that the circumstances of the interaction between the victim and the
police, viewed from an objective standpoint, indicated that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable the police to put an end
to an ongoing emergency.113
In its analysis, the Court recognized that the primary purpose
test was an objective one and stressed the importance of what reasonable participants would have ascertained having encountered the situation in question.114 In essence, the circumstances, including the
statements and actions of the parties involved, should be evaluated as
they appear at the time and not with the benefit of hindsight.115
The Court also stressed the importance of a victim’s medical
condition for purposes of determining the primary purpose of a police
interrogation.116 Although the Court in Bryant disagreed with the
Michigan Supreme Court’s finding that all statements made by a fatally injured victim during police questioning at a crime scene should
be found non-testimonial, it did recognize a victim’s mental state to
be a significant factor in the primary purpose inquiry.117 The Court
it was “calculated for use essentially in the court, not in the business”).
111
131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011).
112
Id. at 1150. The victim was shot by Bryant on Bryant’s property but managed to drive
himself to a nearby parking lot where police found him and questioned him. Id.
113
Id. Therefore, the admission of the victim’s statements at trial did not violate the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his witness. Id.
114
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1156 (“[T]he relevant inquiry into the parties' statements and actions is not the subjective or actual purpose of the particular parties, but the purpose reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the parties’ statements and actions and
the circumstances in which the encounter occurred.”).
115
Id. at n.8. When evaluating the existence of an ongoing emergency, the Court said that
the focus is on the participant’s statements as a means to end the threatening situation, not on
“proving past events potentially relevant to later criminal investigation.” Id. at 1157.
116
Id. at 1148 (“A victim’s medical condition is important to the primary purpose inquiry
to the extent that it sheds light on the victim’s ability to have any purpose at all in responding
to police questions and the likelihood that any such purpose statement would be a testimonial
one.”).
117
Id. at 1159 (“Taking into account the victim’s medical state does not, as the Michigan
Supreme Court below thought, ‘rende[r] non-testimonial . . . all statements made while the
police are questioning a seriously injured complainant.’ ”).
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observed:
The medical condition of the victim is important to the
primary purpose inquiry to the extent that it sheds
light on the ability of the victim to have any purpose at
all in responding to police questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would necessarily be a
testimonial one.118
Furthermore, the Court warned that circumstances surrounding an
ongoing emergency can evolve from non-testimonial to testimonial.119 For example, in situations where a victim is interrogated by police officers in order to provide emergency assistance and the victim’s assailant who posed a threat to the public is no longer at large,
then statements made by the victim could be deemed testimonial.120
The Supreme Court recently faced a similar issue to the one it
faced in Melendez-Diaz. In Bullcoming v. New Mexico,121 the defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated.122 The prosecution sought to introduce a sample containing the defendant’s blood
alcohol as evidence at trial.123 However, the analyst that conducted
the report did not appear at trial;124 instead, the prosecution called another analyst to attest to the sample despite the fact that this analyst
did not actually observe the testing of the defendant’s blood sample.125 The trial court allowed the introduction of the sample finding
that it qualified as a business record, and the defendant was thereafter
convicted.126 The defendant appealed and the case made its way to
the New Mexico Supreme Court, which relied on the holding from
Melendez-Diaz.127 The court ruled that the report containing the de118
Bryant, 131 S.Ct. at 1159 (holding “the victim’s medical state also provides important
context for first responders to judge the existence and magnitude of a continuing threat to the
victim, themselves and the public”). Id.
119
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (“That is not to say that a conversation which begins as an
interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance cannot . . . ‘evolve into testimonial statements.’ ”).
120
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159.
121
131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).
122
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2709.
123
Id. at 2710.
124
Id. at 2711-12.
125
Id. at 2712. The defense objected to the use of this evidence arguing that it violated
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront his witness. Id.
126
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2712.
127
Id. at 2712.
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fendant’s blood alcohol concentration was testimonial, but nonetheless permitted the prosecution to introduce it into evidence.128 This
holding was clearly at odds with Crawford because the New Mexico
Supreme Court admitted the testimonial evidence even though the forensic analyst was unavailable at trial.129 Furthermore, there was no
indication that the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine
the forensic analyst.130
The Supreme Court was faced with the question of whether
the Confrontation Clause allows a forensic analyst to testify to a lab
report that he did not conduct or observe and was conducted for the
purpose of proving a particular fact in a criminal trial.131 The Court
held that the forensic analyst’s testimony made on behalf of the analyst who actually conducted the analysis did not comport with the
Confrontation Clause.132 The Supreme Court rejected the reasoning
applied by the New Mexico Supreme Court and reiterated the rule established by Crawford.133
The Court observed that the analyst who actually performed
the test was in effect certifying more than a machine-generated number.134 The analyst who executed the report certified that he had received the defendant’s blood sample “with the seal unbroken, that he
checked to make sure that the forensic report number and the sample
number ‘corresponded,’ and that he performed on Bullcoming’s sample a particular test, adhering to precise protocol.”135 The absent forensic analyst also attested to the fact that the sample had not been
manipulated.136 The Supreme Court ruled that because the testifying
analyst could neither confirm nor deny what the absentee analyst ob128

Id.
Id. at 2713.
130
Id. at 2714.
131
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
132
Id. (holding that “the accused’s right is to be confronted with the analyst who made the
certification, unless that analyst is unavailable, and the accused had an opportunity, pretrial,
to cross-examine particular scientist”). Id.
133
Id. at 2713 (“[If] an out of court statement is testimonial in nature, it may not be introduced against the accused at trial unless the witness who made the statement is unavailable
and the accused has had a prior opportunity to confront that witness.”). Id.
134
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715.
135
Id. at 2714.
136
Id. (“[H]e further represented, by leaving the ‘remarks’ section of the report blank, that
no ‘circumstance or condition . . . affected the integrity of the sample . . . or the validity of
the analysis.’ ”).
129
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served, the defendant was not afforded a fair opportunity to cross examine.137 Furthermore, had the performing analyst been made available at Bullcoming’s trial, the defense would have had an opportunity
to undermine his credibility by questioning why he had been placed
on unpaid leave and to inquire as to whether he performed the tests
according to the precise protocols.138
V.

NEW YORK APPROACH

New York courts have expanded upon the definitions of testimonial statements provided by the Supreme Court, following a rubric set forth in People v. Rawlins.139 Rawlins illustrated the Court of
Appeals’ use of the “indicia of testimoniality,” including:
(1) [T]he extent to which the entity conducting the
procedure is “an ‘arm’ of law enforcement”; (2)
whether the contents of the report are a contemporaneous record of objective fact, or reflect the exercise
of “fallible human judgment”; (3) the question, closely
related to the previous two, of whether a pro-law enforcement bias is likely to influence the contents of the
report; and (4) whether the report’s contents are “directly accusatory” in the sense they explicitly link the
defendant to the crime.140
The Court of Appeals applied these factors in Rawlins where
a fingerprint analysis was the evidence at issue.141 The prosecution
introduced a report, which included the defendant’s fingerprints and
fingerprints lifted from the scenes of six burglaries.142 Only one of
the two analysts who performed the comparison testified at trial.143
And this analyst concluded that the prints sampled from the crime
scenes matched the defendant’s.144
Using the “indicia of
137

Id. at 2715.
Id.
139
884 N.E.2d 1019 (N.Y. 2008).
140
Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d at 845-46 (quoting Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1030-31 (internal
citations and quotation marks omitted)).
141
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1033.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 1023.
144
Id.
138
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testimoniality,” the court deemed the fingerprint comparison to be
prepared “solely for prosecutorial purposes and, most importantly,
because they were accusatory and offered to establish the defendant’s
identity,” thus touching upon the fourth prong.145 In addition, the
first indicia was also satisfied because police department analysts,
who fall within the category of law enforcement personnel, produced
the evidence.146 Lastly, the fingerprints taken from the scene of the
burglary in question matched the defendant’s, thus linking him to the
burglary.147 In light of this, the court in Rawlins ruled that the fingerprint analysis was testimonial and the defendant was therefore entitled to confront his accusers.148
In the context of hospital and medical reports specifically,
most indicia will not apply. For example, medical professionals such
as doctors and nurses are the ones scribing information of patients,
and neither are generally considered an arm of law enforcement. Also, without more information, it is likely that no pro-law enforcement
bias will influence the hospital staff to alter the report. Most at issue
is the fourth prong, where patients are more likely to identify someone who physically or sexually assaulted them or inflicted any other
harm upon them. But while Crawford and its progeny and Rawlins
have provided frameworks for deciding testimonial evidence subject
to the Confrontation Clause, there is no federal precedent that addresses the testimonial nature of hospital records. In contrast, New
York courts have been faced with deciding whether a defendant’s
confrontation rights are implicated by the admittance of physician
records on a number of occasions.149
A recent Court of Appeals case, People v. Duhs,150 illustrated
New York’s usage of the primary purpose test with respect to a doctor’s testimony concerning a child’s statement made during an examination.151 In Duhs, the defendant allegedly placed his girlfriend’s
145

Id. at 1033.
Rawlins, 884 N.E.2d at 1023.
147
Id. at 1033.
148
Id.
149
See, e.g., People v. Duhs, 947 N.E.2d 617, 618 (N.Y. 2011) (holding that a physician’s
testimony concerning a child’s statement made during an examination that was absent from
the hospital record to be non-testimonial because it was necessary to the child’s medical diagnosis and treatment).
150
947 N.E.2d 617 (N.Y. 2011).
151
Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619-20.
146
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child in a bathtub filled with boiling water resulting in the child suffering third degree burns.152 At trial, the prosecution called upon the
doctor, who examined the child as a witness.153 The doctor testified
to an exchange that occurred between himself and the patient that
was not included in the medical records.154 The defendant objected,
arguing that his right to confront the witnesses against him was violated by allowing the doctor to testify to a conversation he had with
the child.155 The State contended that this statement was not subject
to the Confrontation Clause because it was non-testimonial.156 The
State’s argument was based on the primary purpose test, which indicated that the purpose of the doctor’s question was to determine the
cause of the injury and apply the appropriate treatment, not to elicit
facts or other information to be used later at trial.157 The Court of
Appeals agreed and affirmed the lower court’s holding that the statement in question was non-testimonial.158
The court reasoned that the child’s statement indicating that
his mother’s boyfriend prevented him from getting out of a tub filled
with boiling water was not testimonial because the primary purpose
of the physician’s inquiry was to establish the cause of the accident to
render adequate aid.159 Additionally, the court also recognized that
the Supreme Court has already stated that “ ‘statements to physicians
in the course of receiving treatment would be excluded, if at all, only
by hearsay rules’ and not the Confrontation Clause.”160 Because the
doctor’s first and foremost duty was to offer medical assistance to a
child, and not to obtain information relevant to a future prosecution,
the court concluded that the child’s statement “was germane to his
medical diagnosis and treatment,” and therefore was properly admitted under the medical treatment hearsay exception.”161
152

Id. at 618.
Id.
154
Id. (referring to when the doctor asked the child why he did not get out of the tub and
the child said “he wouldn’t let me out”).
155
Id. at 619.
156
Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 619.
157
Id. at 619-20.
158
Id. at 620.
159
Id. at 619-20.
160
Id. at 620 (quoting Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353, 376 (2008)).
161
Duhs, 947 N.E.2d at 618. The Court of Appeals relied on Davidson v. Cornell, 30
N.E. 573, 576 (N.Y. 1892), which observed the unique circumstances where a patient is
seeking medical attention and “there is a strong inducement for the patient to speak truly of
153
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The Court of Appeals faced another similar situation involving medical records in People v. Ortega. There, the court also allowed the prosecution to introduce hospital records, though the only
difference between this case and Duhs was that the statements were
admitted under a different hearsay exception.162 Ortega provided the
rule that the admissibility of a victim’s medical records under the
business records exception hinges on whether the statement at issue is
relevant to diagnosis and treatment.163
The complainant in Ortega was taken to the hospital after a
physical altercation with her boyfriend.164 Once there, she informed
the medical personnel that her older boyfriend used a belt to strangle
her.165 The attending physician marked in the victim’s report that she
suffered from “domestic violence and asphyxiation.”166 While some
information from the hospital report was redacted at the behest of the
defense counsel, the information concerning references to domestic
violence and the description of the weapon were permitted to be introduced at trial.167 The defendant was convicted of assault and appealed, but the Appellate Division affirmed, “finding that it was a
proper exercise of discretion for the court to allow limited references
in medical records and testimony to the effect that complainant ‘was
diagnosed as having been subjected to domestic violence involving a
former boyfriend,’ as those references were relevant to the proposed
treatment.”168
The Court of Appeals affirmed, going into depth on the trustworthiness of hospital records with respect to criminal trials.169 The
court observed that hospital records are reliable because they reflect
the human emotion to report the facts as they truly occurred, and also
his pains and sufferings . . . .” Id. Therefore statements that are made by a patient describing his “present condition are permitted to be given as evidence only when made a physician
for the purposes of treatment.” Id.
162
Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 216.
163
Id. at 211. The court will admit hospital records under the business records exception
when they “reflect acts, occurrences, or events that relate to diagnosis, prognosis or treatment or are otherwise helpful to an understanding of the medical or surgical aspects of the
particular patient’s hospitalization.” Id. at 214.
164
Id. at 212.
165
Id.
166
Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 212.
167
Id.
168
Id. at 213.
169
Id. at 214.
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because they are designed to be referred to in moments of life and
death.170 Accordingly, hospital records fall within the business records exception when the information contained in them is useful for
understanding the aspects of a patient’s hospitalization, including the
events leading up to hospitalization, diagnosis, and prognosis.171
As examples, the court cited to Williams v. Alexander172 and
People v. Greenlee.173 In Williams, the plaintiff was involved in a car
accident and told the attending physician that a car struck another car
which propelled itself into his vehicle.174 The court determined that
this statement focused primarily on how the accident occurred rather
than on providing information relevant to diagnosis or treatment, and
thus rendered the statement inadmissible as a business record.175 In
contrast, the statement of a woman to a doctor claiming that she was
threatened by her former boyfriend was relevant in order to formulate
a discharge plan to ensure her safety.176 These cases reiterate the rule
that the inquiry regarding a statement’s admissibility is whether the
statement is relevant to a patient’s diagnosis or treatment.177 The
court held that because instances of domestic violence require treatment plans different from other types of assaults due to the intimate
relationship and living conditions of the parties, admitting the references to domestic violence and a safety discharge plan in the hospital
records were not improper.178
VI.

CONSISTENCY IN THE FACE OF NEW YORK AND FEDERAL
PRECEDENT
A.

Is Diaz Consistent with New York Precedent?

The court in Diaz was correct in finding that the hospital re-

170
171
172
173
174
175
176
177
178

Id.
Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 214.
129 N.E.2d 417 (N.Y. 1955).
70 A.D.3d 966 (App. Div. 2nd Dep’t 2010).
Williams, 129 N.E.2d. at 418.
Id. at 420.
Greenlee, 70 A.D.3d at 967.
Ortega, 942 N.E.2d at 215.
Id.
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port was non-testimonial in nature179 and is consistent with Duhs and
its progeny.180 Based on Duhs, the court in Diaz deemed the hospital
report to be non-testimonial because the report included statements
made by the patient to the doctor, which were germane her diagnosis
and treatment.181 The Diaz opinion is also consistent with New
York’s position with respect to admitting hospital records under the
business records exception.182 Not surprisingly, the business records
requirement is noticeably similar to the standard used to determine
the testimonial nature of hospital records.183 The court, in citing to
Ortega, stated that “hospital records [are] admissible under the business records exception when they reflect acts or events that relate to
diagnosis, prognosis, or treatment.”184
The testifying doctor stated that “the record of the complainant’s stay at Whitestone Hospital was kept in regular course of business,”185 and it is assumed that it is within the hospital’s regular
course of business to prepare such reports because whenever a patient
is admitted to a hospital their condition and treatment is documented.
For these reasons, the court in Diaz was correct in finding the hospital records admissible under the business records exception.186
At first glance it could be argued that the defendant posed a
valid argument when he asserted that the hospital records were analogous to the forensic reports in Melendez.187 The opinion does not
elaborate on the basis of his argument, but there are several recognizable similarities. First, a hospital record can be used in the same
manner as a forensic report.188 For example, both can be used to dispel or prove a fact in the prosecution’s case.189 In the Diaz case, the
179

Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5.
Id. at *4.
181
Id. at *4-5.
182
Id. at *5.
183
Id. at *4.
184
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *4.
185
Id. at *2.
186
Id. at *5.
187
Id.
188
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 324 (“[T]he analysts’ statements here prepared specifically
for use at petitioner’s trial were testimony against petitioner, and the analysts were subject to
confrontation under the Sixth Amendment.”).
189
See id. at 311 (utilizing the “primary purpose” test in finding that the forensic reports
indicating the presence of cocaine seized from evidence constituted testimonial evidence,
reasoning that the certified reports were being used to prove or establish historical events
180
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complainant sought medical care from her physician after being
raped.190 Generally, when a patient has endured a rape there are certain medical procedures performed by medical personnel to determine the physical damage caused,191 often referred to as a “rape
kit.”192 The purpose of the rape kit is to preserve physical evidence
following a sexual assault, which can subsequently be used in a rape
investigation.193 The rape kit is then sent to law enforcement for
DNA testing.194 In essence, the rape kit is the first step in the forensic
analysis. Assuming a rape kit was actually performed in Diaz and the
results were sent for DNA testing, it is likely that this information
would have been included in the complainant’s hospital record. The
results of the rape kit could then be used to prove the prosecution’s
case, which supports the argument that the report was prepared in anticipation of litigation and thus testimonial.195 Moreover, if the hospital record was deemed testimonial, then the hospital resident would
have been a “witness” for purposes of the Confrontation Clause.196
However, the court in Diaz did not go into much detail with
respect to how much reliance the doctor placed on the hospital reports or whether or not the doctor was familiar with the hospital’s
procedures.197 Instead, the Diaz opinion merely stated that the doctor
reviewed the hospital record and that he signed the record because he
agreed with the resident’s notations.198 Furthermore, Diaz’s contention that his situation was analogous to that in Melendez-Diaz falls
short because, unlike the analysts in Melendez-Diaz, the doctor in his
relevant to a criminal trial expected to take place in the future).
190
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2-*3. Recall that the complainant was then admitted to
the hospital where she was treated by a hospital resident who made notations in her hospital
record as to his observations. Id. at *1. Dr. Fuchs then testified to his own examinations of
the complainant and to the hospital record of the complainant’s stay. Id. at *2.
191
Jill E. Daly, Gathering Dust on the Evidence Shelves of the United States—Rape Victims and Their Rape Kits: Do Rape Victims Have Recourse Against State and Federal Justice Systems?, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 17, 21 (2003).
192
N.Y. CRIM. LAW § 6:64 (McKinney 2011).
193
Daly, supra note 191, at 21.
194
Id. at *5.
195
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5.
196
Compare id. (ruling that the hospital report contained statements from non-testifying
persons), with Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311-12 (“The forensic reports certifying the presence of cocaine, are comparable to ‘live in-court testimony, doing precisely what a witness
does on direct examination.’ ”).
197
Brown, 918 N.E.2d at 932.
198
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2.
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case actually treated and diagnosed the complainant.199
The trend among New York cases is that the defendant rarely
has the opportunity to confront the analysts or doctors who actually
prepare the reports being used against him or her at trial because such
evidence is regularly deemed non-testimonial.200 Notice that the New
York Court of Appeals has already ruled hospital reports, forensic reports, autopsy reports, and DNA reports containing the results of a
rape kit, to be non-testimonial in nature.201 Essentially, New York
courts find that raw factual data does not implicate Confrontation
Clause concerns. New York’s pro-non-testimonial view is distinguishable from the Supreme Court, which has consistently found forensic reports to be testimonial in nature and subject to the Confrontation Clause.202
B.

If the Supreme Court Hears the Hospital Records
Issue, How Will it Decide?

The Supreme Court’s strict approach to the Confrontation
Clause is distinguishable from the New York Court of Appeals. Federal precedent demonstrates the Supreme Court’s position on preserving the defendant’s constitutional right to confront his or her witness.
Perhaps that is why the Court is cautious in its determinations of what
evidence is deemed testimonial.
As previously noted, the United States Supreme Court has not
been faced with the issue of deciding whether a hospital report is
considered testimonial for purposes of the Confrontation Clause. But
based on Crawford and its progeny, there is some indication that the
Court might come to a finding similar to that of the forensic reports
in Melendez-Diaz.203 Similar to the forensic reports in Melendez199

Id.
Duhs, 947 N.E. 2d at 619-20. See also People v. Hall, 923 N.Y.S.2d 428 (2011) (finding that the autopsy report was properly admitted as business record despite fact that medical
examiner who created report did not testify); People v. Freycinet, 892 N.E.2d 843 (N.Y.
2008) (factual portions of autopsy report were not testimonial and could be introduced as a
business record without doctor who performed autopsy); People v. Brown, 918 N.E.2d 927
(N.Y. 2008) (holding DNA report containing “raw data” admitted as business record despite
fact that analyst who prepared report did not testify).
201
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5.
202
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 311; Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2710.
203
Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 310 (“There is little doubt that the documents at issue in
this case fall within the core clause of testimonial statements [described in Crawford.]”).
200
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Diaz, the Court would likely find hospital reports susceptible to manipulation.204 For example, when a patient is being observed in a
hospital, their chart is accessible to a number of nurses, doctors, and
medical students who may make notations as they see fit.205 While
hospital records include notations as to machine-generated data, e.g.,
vitals, heart rate, etc., they also include subjective observations of the
patient’s condition.206 These subjective observations include the patient’s physical appearance, statements made by the patient to the
physician, and the patient’s mental state.207 This argument is comparable to the reasoning set forth in Bullcoming.208
In light of the Supreme Court’s strict adherence to preserving
a defendant’s right to confront their accusers, it is unlikely that the
Court would admit any record containing subjective observations
through the testimony of a surrogate witness. The rationale behind
this was addressed in Bullcoming. Like the analyst in Bullcoming,
the doctor in Diaz was not only attesting to raw data but rather the
condition of the complainant based on the perspective of other hospital employees.209 It is one thing to account for one’s own medical
expertise, but it is quite another to testify to the knowledge and experience of others. This is especially dangerous because doctors often
have different opinions regarding treatment options and can misdiagnose. Moreover, like the testifying analyst in Bullcoming, the doctor
in Diaz could neither confirm nor deny what the absentee hospital
resident observed during his analysis.210 This in turn did not give Diaz a fair opportunity to cross-examine.211 For these reasons, it is un204

Id. at 318 (“Forensic evidence is not uniquely immune from the risk of manipulation.”).
205
Id. at 320 (“At the time of trial, petitioner did not know what tests the analysts performed, whether those tests were routine, and whether interpreting their results required the
exercise of judgment or the use of skills that the analysts may not have had.”).
206
Mark R. Bower, Providing a Separate Cause of Action in Malpractice Cases, for Violation of the Federal “Anti-Dumping” Act, N.Y. ST. B. J. 34, 35 (1994).
207
Id.
208
See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 (recognizing that “[t]hese representations, relating
to past events and human actions not revealed in raw, machine-produced data, are meant for
cross-examination”).
209
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *2.
210
Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (“But surrogate testimony of the kind [the surrogate
analyst] was equipped to give could not convey what [the absentee analyst] knew or observed about the events his certification concerned, i.e., the particular test and testing process
he employed.”).
211
Id. at 2716 (“Accordingly, the Clause does not tolerate dispensing with confrontation
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likely that the Supreme Court would declare a hospital report nontestimonial because of the probability that it contains subjective observations.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court adopted Bryant’s “on
going emergency” approach in assessing the testimonial nature of
hospital records, it would find such records to be non-testimonial in
certain situations.212 The circumstances surrounding an ongoing
emergency are similar to those when a complainant makes a statement to their doctor for purposes of seeking medical treatment.213
For example, when a physician makes inquiries to his patient’s condition, those statements made by the patient are for the purpose of sustaining human life and not in anticipation of a criminal trial.214 The
Court would apply the same factors as it did in Bryant.215 Under the
Bryant analysis, it would evaluate whether the victim is stable versus
whether the victim is fatally wounded and is conscious of his or her
condition. Similar to that of the police officer in Bryant whose job is
to diminish the threat, the doctor’s job is to stabilize his patient.216
Due to the overwhelming likelihood that any hospital report
would include subjective observations, it is improbable that the Court
would apply the “on going emergency” standard if there were a surrogate witness testifying to such report. In light of this, and the arguable similarities shared between forensic reports and hospital records,
the Supreme Court would adopt the same reasoning as they did in
Melendez-Diaz or Bullcoming.
VII.

CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the Diaz opinion is clearly consistent with New
York precedent established by Duhs and the cases that followed.
New York’s position with respect to the testimonial nature of hospital
records and forensic reports is clearly at odds with the federal apsimply because the court believes that questioning one witness about another’s testimonial
statements provides a fair enough opportunity for cross-examination.”).
212
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1147-48.
213
Id. at 1148 (“A victim’s medical condition is important to the primary purpose inquiry
to the extent that it sheds light on the victim’s ability to have any purpose at all in responding
to police questions and on the likelihood that any such purpose would be a testimonial
one.”).
214
Diaz, 2012 WL 1606311, at *5.
215
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162.
216
Id. at 1159.
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proach. New York infringes on the Sixth Amendment rights of defendants by being too relaxed in its rendering of hospital records and
forensic reports as non-testimonial, thereby not giving defendants an
opportunity to confront their accusers.
Based on the Court’s decisions in Melendez-Diaz and
Bullcoming, the Supreme Court would likely consider hospital records to constitute testimonial evidence within the scope of the Confrontation Clause. Federal precedent has made it abundantly clear
that a defendant’s right to confront his accuser is not a dispositive
right and therefore it is unlikely that the Supreme Court would render
all hospital records to be non-testimonial.
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